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Baird, Douglas

Game Theory & the Law (Paper)

€ 59.35

This book is the first to apply the tools of game theory and information economics to advance our understanding of how law works. The book highlights the basic mechanisms at work and lays out a natural progression in the sophistication of the game concepts and legal problems considered. 47 line illustrations


Taal / Language : English

Inhoudsopgave:
Preface xi
Introduction: Understanding Strategic Behavior 1(3)
Bibliographic Notes 4(2)
1 Simultaneous Decisionmaking and the Normal Form Game
6(44)
The Normal Form Game
6(8)
Using Different Games to Compare Legal Regimes
14(5)
The Nash Equilibrium
19(5)
Civil Liability, Accident Law, and Strategic Behavior
24(4)
Legal Rules and the Idea of Strict Dominance
28(3)
Collective Action Problems and the Two-by-Two Game
31(4)
The Problem of Multiple Nash Equilibria
35(11)
Summary
46(1)
Bibliographic Notes
46(4)
2 Dynamic Interaction and the Extensive Form Game
50(29)
The Extensive Form Game and Backwards Induction
50(7)
A Dynamic Model of Preemption and Strategic Commitment
57(6)
Subgame Perfection
63(12)
Summary
75(2)
Bibliographic Notes
77(2)
3 Information Revelation, Disclosure Laws, and Renegotiation
79(43)
Incorporating Beliefs into the Solution Concept
80(3)
The Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Solution Concept
83(6)
Verifiable Information, Voluntary Disclosure, and the Unraveling Result
89(6)
Disclosure Laws and the Limits of Unraveling
95(14)
Observable Information, Norms, and the Problem of Renegotiation
109(3)
Optimal Incentives and the Need for Renegotiation
112(4)
Limiting the Ability of Parties to Renegotiate
116(2)
Summary
118(1)
Bibliographic Notes
119(3)
4 Signaling, Screening, and Nonverifiable Information
122(37)
Signaling and Screening
122(3)
Modeling Nonverifiable Information
125(17)
Signals and the Effects of Legal Rules
142(5)
Information Revelation and Contract Default Rules
147(6)
Screening and the Role of Legal Rules
153(3)
Summary
156(1)
Bibliographic Notes
157(2)
5 Reputation and Repeated Games
159(29)
Backwards Induction and Its Limits
159(6)
Infinitely Repeated Games, Tacit Collusion, and Folk Theorems
165(13)
Reputation, Predation, and Cooperation
178(8)
Summary
186(1)
Bibliographic Notes
186(2)
6 Collective Action, Embedded Games, and the Limits of Simple Models
188(31)
Collective Action and the Role of Law
189(2)
Embedded Games
191(4)
Understanding the Structure of Large Games
195(7)
Collective Action and Private Information
202(6)
Collective Action Problems in Sequential Decisionmaking
208(5)
Herd Behavior
213(4)
Summary
217(1)
Bibliographic Notes
217(2)
7 Noncooperative Bargaining
219(25)
Modeling the Division of Gains from Trade
219(5)
Legal Rules as Exit Options
224(8)
Bargaining and Corporate Reorganizations
232(5)
Collective Bargaining and Exit Options
237(4)
Summary
241(1)
Bibliographic Notes
241(3)
8 Bargaining and Information
244(24)
Basic Models of the Litigation Process
244(7)
Modeling Separate Trials for Liability and Damages
251(9)
Information and Selection Bias
260(1)
Discovery Rules and Verifiable Information
261(5)
Summary
266(1)
Bibliographic Notes
266(2)
Conclusion: Information and the Limits of Law 268(7)
Notes 275(14)
References 289(12)
Glossary 301(18)
Index 319
Extra informatie: 
Paperback / softback
344 pagina's
Januari 1998
398 gram
237 x 163 x 25 mm
Harvard University Press us

Levertijd: 5 tot 11 werkdagen