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James F. Adams

A Unified Theory of Party Competition

A Cross-National Analysis Integrating Spatial and Behavioral Factors

€ 57.44



Taal / Language : English

Inhoudsopgave:
List of Tables and Figures x
Acknowledgments xvii
1 Modeling Party Competition
1(14)
1.1 Introduction to the Unified Theory of Party Competition
1(4)
1.2 Data and Methodology
5(1)
1.3 Justifying Our Theoretical Focus: Why Assume a Unified Model of Party Competition with Vote-Maximizing Parties?
6(4)
1.4 Plan of the Book
10(5)
2 How Voters Decide: The Components of the Unified Theory of Voting
15(13)
2.1 Introduction
15(1)
2.2 The Policy-Only Model
16(3)
2.3 Nonpolicy Factors: The Unified Model
19(4)
2.4 The Unified Discounting Model
23(3)
2.5 Discussion
26(2)
3 Linking Voter Choice to Party Strategies: Illustrating the Role of Nonpolicy Factors
28(24)
3.1 Introduction
28(3)
3.2 The Logic of Policy Competition in the Unified Spatial Model: Illustrative Examples of How Nonpolicy Considerations Matter
31(9)
3.3 Party Competition and the Concept of Equilibrium in Policy Strategies
40(6)
3.4 Empirical Application to the 1988 French Presidential Election
46(6)
4 Factors Influencing the Link between Party Strategy and the Variables Affecting Voter Choice: Theoretical Results
52(20)
4.1 Introduction
52(1)
4.2 The Model
53(4)
4.3 Centrifugal Incentives for Candidate Strategies
57(6)
4.4 An Empirical Illustration
63(4)
4.5 Robustness of Equilibrium Positions to the Salience of Partisanship
67(3)
4.6 Discussion
70(2)
5 Policy Competition under the Unified Theory: Empirical Applications to the 1988 French Presidential Election
72(22)
5.1 Introduction
72(1)
5.2 The Context of the 1988 French Presidential Election
73(4)
5.3 Candidate Competition under the Policy-Only Model
77(2)
5.4 Candidate Competition under a Unified Model with Nonpolicy Factors
79(6)
5.5 Candidate Competition under a Unified Discounting Model
85(8)
5.6 Conclusion
93(1)
6 Policy Competition under the Unified Theory: Empirical Applications to the 1989 Norwegian Parliamentary Election
94(23)
6.1 Introduction
94(2)
6.2 Ideology and Policy Issues in the 1989 Parliamentary Election
96(3)
6.3 Party Competition in the Policy-Only Model
99(3)
6.4 Party Competition in the Unified Model
102(3)
6.5 Party Competition in a Unified Discounting Model
105(6)
6.6 Coalition-Seeking Motivations
111(5)
6.7 Conclusion
116(1)
7 The Threat of Abstention: Candidate Strategies and Policy Representation in U.S. Presidential Elections
117(15)
7.1 Introduction
117 (3)
7.2 Incorporating the Turnout Decision into the Unified Voting Model
120 (3)
7.3 Candidate Strategies under the Unified Turnout Model: Illustrative Arguments
123(7)
7.4 Conclusion
130(2)
8 Candidate Strategies with Voter Abstention in U.S. Presidential Elections: 1980, 1984, 1988, 1996, and 2000
132(20)
8.1 Introduction
132 (1)
8.2 Hypotheses on Voting Behavior and Candidate Strategies under the Unified Turnout Model
133 (1)
8.3 Candidate Competition in the 1988 American Presidential Election
134 (8)
8.4 Unified Turnout Models for the 1980, 1984, 1988, 1996, and 2000 U.S. Presidential Elections
142 (2)
8.5 Candidate Equilibrium under the Unified Turnout Model
144(3)
8.6 The Unified Turnout Model with Policy Discounting
147(3)
8.7 Discussion
150(2)
9 Policy Competition in Britain: The 1997 General Election
152(18)
9.1 Introduction
152(2)
9.2 Ideology and Policy Issues in the 1997 General Election
154(2)
9.3 Party Competition under the Policy-Only Model
156(4)
9.4 Party Competition under the Unified Model
160 (4)
9.5 Party Competition under a Unified Turnout Model: The Strategic Effects of Abstention due to Alienation
164(4)
9.6 Conclusion
168(2)
10 The Consequences of Voter Projection: Assimilation and Contrast Effects 170(14)
10.1 Introduction
170(1)
10.2 Data Analysis
171(11)
10.3 Discussion
182(2)
11 Policy-Seeking Motivations of Parties in Two-Party Elections: Theory 184(17)
11.1 Introduction
184 (3)
11.2 Spatial Models with Full Information: How Valence Advantages Motivate Divergence between Policy-Seeking Candidates
187(1)
11.3 A Policy-Seeking Model with Incomplete Information, Part 1: The Effects of Uncertainty about the Impact of Valence Issues
188(7)
11.4 A Policy-Seeking Model with Incomplete Information, Part 2: The Effects of Uncertainty about the Voter Distribution
195(4)
11.5 Conclusion
199(2)
12 Policy-Seeking Motivations of Parties in Two-Party Elections: Empirical Analysis 201(26)
12.1 Introduction
201(3)
12.2 Equilibrium Strategies under Electoral Certainty
204 (4)
12.3 Modeling Election Uncertainty over Valence Issues in Empirical Applications
208 (4)
12.4 Candidate Equilibria under Valence-Related Election Uncertainty
212 (10)
12.5 Equilibria under Policy-Related Uncertainty: Application to France
222(3)
12.6 Discussion
225(2)
13 Concluding Remarks 227(14)
13.1 Introduction
227 (5)
13.2 Evaluating the Unified Model: Does It Satisfactorily Explain Party Behavior?
232(2)
13.3 Directions for Future Research
234(5)
13.4 Final Remarks
239(2)
Appendix 1.1 Literature Review: Work Linking Behavioral Research to Spatial Modeling 241(4)
Appendix 2.1 Alternative Statistical Models of Voter Choice 245(2)
Appendix 2.2 Controversies in Voting Research: The Electoral Impact of Party Identification 247(4)
Appendix 2.3 Relationship between the Unified Discounting Model and the Directional Model of Rabinowitz and Macdonald 251(3)
Appendix 3.1 Spatial Models That Incorporate Valence Dimensions of Candidate Evaluation 254(4)
Appendix 4.1 Uniqueness Theorem and Algorithm for Computing Nash Equilibria 258(5)
Appendix 4.2 Proof of Theorem 4.1 263(2)
Appendix 4.3 Simulation Analysis and an Approximation Formula for Nash Equilibria 265(3)
Appendix 4.4 Derivations of Formulas Relating Electoral Factors to the Shrinkage Factor, ck 268(2)
Appendix 6.1 Equilibria for Outcome-Oriented Motivations: The Kedar Model 270(5)
Appendix 7.1 Proof of Lemma 7.1 275(2)
Appendix 7.2 Derivations for the Unified Turnout Model 277(2)
Appendix 8.1 Coding and Model Specifications 279(3)
Appendix 8.2 Alternative Turnout Models 282(5)
Appendix 11.1 Proof of Theorem 11.1 287(2)
Appendix 11.2 Empirical Estimation of the Mean and Standard Deviation of Valence Effects 289(4)
References 293(14)
Index 307
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Paperback / softback
311 pagina's
Januari 2005
454 gram
222 x 152 x 25 mm
CAMBRIDGE UNIV PR us


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